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Virginity testing: a crime, a delict or a genuine 
cultural tradition?
TW BENNETT*, C MILLS** AND G MUNNICK***
1  Introduction: the revival of a traditional cultural practice
All the indigenous cultures of Southern Africa placed a high value on female 
virginity,1 and, in order to protect this bargaining chip in marriage negotiations, 
young girls were obliged to undergo regular virginity inspections.2 During the early 
part of the twentieth century, the practice fell into disuse, due largely to the erosion 
of family structures through migrant labour, forced removals and Western influenc-
es.3 Over the last twenty years or so, however, the inspections have been resumed, 
mainly, it seems, in order to reinstate the importance of pre-marital chastity.4
In the past, virginity testing was usually performed by mothers or senior kins-
women within the confines of the family,5 but, in recent years, it has become a major 
public ritual.6 In the Zulu kingdom, for instance, it is now mainly associated with 
two major national festivals, the First Fruits’ Festival (Nomkhubulwane)7 and the 
Royal Reed Dance (umKhosi womhlanga). The latter is an occasion when young 
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1 May Virginity Testing  Towards Outlawing the Cultural Practice that Violates our Daughters (2003 
thesis UWC) 7-11.
2 Although such inspections have attracted particular attention in the KwaZulu-Natal province of 
South Africa, the procedure is not unique to the cultures of this country. Kelly Performing Virginity 
and Testing Chastity in the Middle Ages (2000) ix.
3 Mahery Virginity Testing and the Children’s Bill, Discussion Paper, 11 October 2005, Children’s Insti-
tute, University of Cape Town, available at http://www.ci.org.za/site/frames.asp?section=publications 
(22-01-2009) 5.
4 Scorgie “Virginity testing and the politics of sexual responsibility: implications for AIDS interven-
tion” 2002 African Studies 1 57.
5 Van der Vliet “Growing up in traditional society” in Hammond-Tooke (ed) The Bantu-speaking 
Peoples of Southern Africa (1974) 236-237. Leclerc-Madlala “Virginity testing: managing sexual-
ity in a maturing HIV/AIDS epidemic” 2001 Medical Anthropology Quarterly (Special Issue “The 
contributions of medical anthropology to anthropology and beyond”) 533 539 reports that some 
virginity testers claim that “they would like to educate all mothers to be able to inspect their daugh-
ters themselves. One tester firmly stated that mothers should start checking daughters as soon as 
possible around the age of two or three and to do so on a daily basis. She stated, ‘Just as you wash her 
body and comb her hair, you can check if she’s still ‘clean’ down there’.”
6 George “Virginity testing and South Africa’s HIV/AIDS crisis: Beyond rights universalism and 
cultural relativism toward health capabilities” 2008 California Law Review 1447 1455; Le Roux 
Harmful Traditional Practices, (Male Circumcision and Virginity Testing of Girls) and the Legal 
Rights of Children (2006 thesis UWC) 2 and May (n 1) 2. Various other cultures in Southern Africa, 
including the Shona and Pondo, used to encourage virginity inspections, but the practice died out or 
was discontinued. See Holleman Shona Customary Law (1952) 83. Apparently, the girls refused to 
submit, and the tests “made trouble”, because a finding that a girl had lost her virginity could cause 
a quarrel with the mother – Hunter Reaction to Conquest  Effects of contact with Europeans on the 
Pondo of South Africa (1961) 183.
7 May (n 1) 6 and Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 538.
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girls may celebrate their chastity before the king, who is then free to choose a bride 
from amongst their number.8
Traditional leaders, eager to promote the virtues of female virginity, are encour-
aging girls to participate in the inspection procedure. No lesser person than presi-
dent Jacob Zuma himself declared that, “[g]irls knew that their virginity was their 
family’s treasure”.9 Indeed, such is the popularity of virginity testing that it is being 
revived in areas outside Zululand.10
The tests now take place in many different settings, ranging from family homes, 
to schools, to community centres and public stadiums.11 Some girls are inspected on 
a regular basis,12 while others are inspected only annually at such ceremonies as the 
Royal Reed Dance. On these occasions, the subjects must lie on straw mats, spread 
their legs, and then pull back their labia to allow adult women to check whether their 
hymens are intact. The inspection is quick, and is often performed bare-handed by 
the testers (none of whom have medical qualifications).13
In some instances, the testers classify the girls according to a three grade system, 
‘A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’. While the ‘A’ grade indicates a girl who has passed, the ‘B’ indicates 
a girl who may have had intercourse once or twice, and may have been sexually 
abused. The ‘C’ grade obviously denotes a fail.14 These grades are awarded accord-
ing to various physical signs, including the size of the opening of the vagina, its 
wetness, the pinkness of the labia, evidence of an intact hymen, the firmness of the 
breasts, abdomen and muscles behind the knees, and whether the girl’s eyes have 
“known men”.15
If a girl passes the test, she is then marked with a white clay spot on her forehead. 
If she fails, she receives a red spot.16 The successful candidates are given certifi-
cates, and, in theory at least, those who failed are given counselling.17
Candidates for the test are anywhere between the ages of seven and twenty-six.18 
Ostensibly, they participate voluntarily, but it is doubtful whether consent is always 
freely given. Some of the girls are obviously too young to make up their own minds, 
and many, no doubt, submit under parental and social pressure.
8 Because only virgins may take part in the Reed Dance, their status must be established before they 
are entitled to participate. May (n 1) 6 and Mahery (n 3) 5.
9 See the article “SA leader urges virginity tests” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3683210.stm 
(19-01-2009) where Zuma endorsed the practice on the basis that it is an African custom for a woman 
to value her virginity. See, too, Tyali “Zuma takes a stand on virginity testing” Mail & Guard-
ian Online (23-09-2004) http://www.mg.co.za/article/2004-09-23-zumatakes-a-stand-on-virginity-
testing (1-06-2009).
10 George (n 6) 1459 citing “Activists challenge girls’ virginity testing” Independent (17-07-2003).
11 May (n 1) 6 and Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 538.
12 May (n 1) 6 and Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 539.
13 May (n 1) 6.
14 See Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 539-40.
15 May (n 1) 6-7. An intact hymen, however, is obviously an unreliable indicator of chastity: Le Roux (n 
6) 14. Also see Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 540 who notes: “Here, biomedical ‘reality’ and scientific ‘truth’ 
are of little import. What the testers look at and look for as evidence of virginity is framed within 
folk constructs of the body and ethno medical beliefs of health and illness. This indigenous knowl-
edge is a knowledge that is largely articulated through metaphor and symbolic representation.”
16 Le Roux (n 6) 15 and Mahery (n 3) 6.
17 Le Roux (n 6) 15; Leclerc-Madala (n 5) 538 and Mahery (n 3) 6.
18 Mahery (n 3) 6. In some instances, the girls being tested are as young as five years old – Leclerc-
Madlala (n 5) 537.
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Because of the probable lack of consent, virginity inspections have given wide-
spread cause for concern about the violation of fundamental human rights.19 The 
South African commission on gender equality and the South African commission 
on human rights, for instance, called for a total ban on the procedure, arguing that 
it discriminates against women and violates their rights to dignity and personal 
security.20
2 Statutory regulation and criminal offences
In response to these calls, parliament took action.21 Hence, section 12 of the Chil-
dren’s Act22 provides that:
“(4) Virginity testing of children under the age of 16 is prohibited.
(5) Virginity testing of children older than 16 may only be performed –
 (a) if the child has given consent to the testing in the prescribed manner;
 (b) after proper counselling of the child; and
 (c) in the manner prescribed.
(6) The results of a virginity test may not be disclosed without the consent of the child.
(7) The body of a child who has undergone virginity testing may not be marked.”
From these provisions, it appears that a girl may be tested only if she is over the age 
of 16 and gives her consent in the prescribed manner.
In spite of these safeguards, the Children’s Act has certain significant omissions: 
it gives no indication what is meant by the “prescribed manner”; it does not define 
“consent”23 and no mention is made of whether virginity testing is prohibited when 
conducted in domestic (as opposed to public) settings. The only evidence we have 
that any of these issues were officially considered is a meeting of the select commit-
tee on social services (department of social development), which was held to debate 
amended regulations to the act.24 At this gathering, members discussed “consent” 
and the “prescribed manner” in which virginity tests were to be performed.
A set of regulations did not in fact ensue from this meeting, but the select commit-
tee seems to have contemplated making the following protocols mandatory: com-
pletion of a consent form, to be signed by both the persons conducting and receiving 
the test; conducting the tests in private hygienic circumstances on an individual 
basis; sterilising all equipment, and using sterilised surgical gloves; permitting only 
women to perform the test, and only when satisfied that the girls are over 16 years 
19 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child “Concluding observations of the committee on the rights 
of the child: South Africa” (22 Feb 2000) 33 UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add 122.
20 South African Government Information “Virginity testing”, issued by the Commission for Gender 
Equality, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08091713451001.htm (22-01-2009). See further Le 
Roux (n 6) 17 and Mahery (n 3) 6-7.
21 For the history of this legislation, see George (n 6) 1478 ff.
22 38 of 2005.
23 In s 129, however, the act provides that, from the age of 12, children may consent to medical treat-
ment, provided that they are of sufficient maturity and have the mental capacity to understand the 
benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment. Because virginity testing can hardly 
be said to constitute medical treatment, this provision is inapplicable.
24 Held on 11 Nov 2008. A summary of this meeting and the recorded audio file can be found on the Parlia-
mentary Monitoring Group webpage http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20081111-children%E2%80%99s-
act-amended-regulations-briefing-department-social-develop (4-02-2009). The discussion concerning 
virginity testing can be heard on the audio file from (time) 1:07:50.
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of age;25 paying due regard to the girls’ bodily integrity. Any breach of such regula-
tions would have amounted to an offence under the act.
While requirements such as these attempt to enforce basic health and human 
rights standards, they are being openly ignored by traditional leaders and those re-
sponsible for the inspection procedure.26 Hence, the tests are still being performed. 
In many cases, the girls are below the age of 16,27 sometimes as young as five,28 and 
the girls are often marked as passing or failing,29 probably without the provision of 
proper counselling facilities for those who fail.
The organisers of the events, however, would have cause to revise their attitudes 
if they become aware that they may face charges of rape, as opposed to a lesser of-
fence of contravening a statutory regulation on child welfare.30 The charge of rape is 
made possible by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amend-
ment Act (here abbreviated to the Sexual Offences Act),31 which recently repealed 
the common-law crime of rape, and replaced it with a much expanded offence.
The new offence is contained in section 3, which provides that any person who 
unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual penetration with another per-
son, without the latter’s consent, is guilty of rape. Virginity testing might well be 
included in this provision, because the examination entailed would probably fall 
within the definition of “sexual penetration”. Under the new act, this phrase is de-
fined to include: “any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by – … 
(b) any other part of the body of one person … into or beyond the genital organs or 
anus of another person …”.32
In addition to broadening the definition of rape, the Sexual Offences Act provides 
a detailed definition of what is meant by the victim’s consent, thereby dramatically 
restricting a time-honoured defence to rape charges. The act provides that, “where 
[the complainant] is incapable in law of appreciating the nature of the sexual act, 
including where [the complainant] is, at the time of the commission of such sexual 
act – … a child below the age of 12 years …”,33 she does not voluntarily or without 
coercion agree to an act of sexual penetration (as contemplated in section 3). In 
consequence, a girl under 12 years of age is presumed to be incapable of consenting 
to genital penetration, and, if subjected to virginity testing, could be said to have 
been raped.
In addition, of course, the test would violate section 12(4) of the Children’s Act, 
but the latter offence would attract a lesser penalty.
The Sexual Offences Act has further special provisions dealing with girls over 
the age of 12 and under the age of 16. Because members of this group are still 
deemed to be “children” for the purposes of the act,34 virginity testing on them 
25 According to the discussion, proof of age in the form of an identification document or a sworn affida-
vit by the girl’s guardian would be required.
26 Le Roux (n 6) 65 cites, eg, inkosi Patekile Holomisa, president of the congress of traditional leaders 
of South Africa, who declared that: “There are laws that are passed that do not necessarily have an 
impact on the lives of people. I imagine this will be one of those.”
27 Mahery (n 3) 6.
28 Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 537.
29 Le Roux (n 6) 15 and Mahery (n 3) 6.
30 S 305 of the Children’s Act provides that a person who contravenes the prohibitions set out in s 12(4), 
(6) or (7) or fails to comply with s 12(5) is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceed-
ing ten years, or to both a fine and such imprisonment.
31 32 of 2007.
32 s 1(1).
33 s 1(3)(d)(iv).
34 s 1(1) defines the term “child” as “a person 12 years or older but under the age of 16”.
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could also amount to a crime under section 15(1). The latter section provides that 
any person who sexually penetrates a child is, notwithstanding the child’s consent, 
guilty of statutory rape.35
It may be argued that certain testing methods do not constitute “sexual penetra-
tion”, but, even so, a less invasive act may constitute a “sexual assault”. This action 
is defined in the Sexual Offences Act36 as the unlawful and intentional sexual viola-
tion of a complainant without that person’s consent.37 The act further defines “sexual 
violation” to include: “direct or indirect contact between the genital organs or anus 
of one person or, in the case of a female, her breasts, and any part of the body of 
another person or any object.”38 Moreover, special provision is made for the crime of 
consensual sexual violation – statutory sexual assault – which occurs where a child 
between the ages of 12 and 16 consents to an act of sexual violation.39
In summary, a vaginal inspection of a girl below the age of 16 is a violation of the 
Children’s Act, carrying a criminal penalty. It may, in addition, amount to a more 
serious crime: rape, statutory rape, sexual assault or statutory sexual assault.
Depending upon the nature of the investigation and the validity of the victim’s 
consent, tests performed on persons over the age of 16 may also be regarded as rape 
or sexual assault. In this regard, the Sexual Offences Act, unlike the Children’s Act, 
defines “consent” as any “voluntary or uncoerced agreement”.40 The definition con-
tinues to provide that consent will be absent when a complainant submits or is sub-
jected to a sexual act through “the use of force or intimidation”,41 or, significantly in 
the case of virginity testing, “where there is an abuse of power or authority by A to 
the extent that B is inhibited from indicating his or her unwillingness or resistance 
to the sexual act, or unwillingness to participate in such a sexual act”.42
It follows that an apparent consent to undergo testing will very likely fail to meet 
the requirements of this definition, because the girl in question complied out of fear 
of a traditional authority or the social stigma of abstaining.43 What is more, if she 
was not given the required pre-test counselling, she would not be fully aware of the 
prejudice she might suffer. Thus, any consent given may, more properly, be treated 
as mere “submission”. As the courts have earlier cautioned, although consent may 
be inferred from a victim’s conduct (rather than words), absence of resistance does 
not necessarily mean consent. Fear may drive the victim into a state of passivity, 
which then means no more than “the abandonment of outward resistance which the 
woman, while persisting in her objection to intercourse, is afraid to display or real-
izes is useless”.44
Notwithstanding this attempt to protect victims from what often used to be a 
successful defence of consent, the burden of proving lack of consent will fall on 
the state. In other words, if the victim simply submitted, thereby giving an appar-
35 The act is criminalised, because underage persons are not yet old enough to appreciate the implica-
tions of sexual acts – Snyman Criminal Law (2008) 393.
36 s 5 (1).








43 Le Roux (n 6) 66, May (n 1) 41 and Mahery (n 3) 9-10.
44 R v Swiggelaar 1950 1 PH H61 (AD) 110-111. The common law on this topic has now, of course, been 
superseded by s 1(2) and (3) of the Sexual Offences Act. See Snyman (n 35) 363.
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ent consent to the sexual act, the state must prove that her consent was involun-
tary or coerced, and, given the standard of proof in criminal cases, this is a heavy 
burden.45
The children’s and sexual offences acts leave one critical question unanswered: 
do they apply in domestic situations? In other words, is a mother prohibited from 
conducting a vaginal examination of her own daughter? From one point of view, 
such a practice might be seen as a serious invasion of bodily integrity and personal 
privacy, while, from another, it might seem to be no more than a normal duty of 
responsible parenting. Culture is the determining factor.46
A justification of cultural tradition, however, may well founder on the growing 
sense of concern about the abuse of women and children by family members,47 and, 
for that reason, the need to extend the reach of public law into the family domain.48 
In Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria, for instance, the constitu-
tional court observed:
“Although the great majority of females, for the most part in rural South Africa, remain trapped in 
cultural patterns of sex-based hierarchy, there is and has been a gradual movement towards recogni-
tion of a female as the survivor of rape rather than other antiquated interests or societal morals being 
at the core of the definition. The focus is on the breach of ‘a more specific right such as the right 
to bodily integrity’ and security of the person and the right to be protected from degradation and 
abuse. The crime of rape should therefore be seen in that context.”49
While it could be argued, on the one hand, that an accused mother will probably 
lack the intention necessary to constitute the crime of raping her daughter, it must be 
remembered that dolus eventualis suffices. On the other hand, the prosecution might 
have difficulty in establishing the further requirement of the accused’s knowledge 
of unlawfulness, because this element of the crime rests on an awareness of the 
daughter’s consent. The state would have to show that the mother was aware that 
her daughter did not consent.
In this regard, however, vaginal inspection of a girl below the age of 12 could 
be deemed rape or sexual assault, because the girl could not legally consent to any 
sexual act. And, even if the girl were between the ages of 12 and 16 years, an offence 
would be committed, since an adult who engages in sexual acts in these circum-
stances commits statutory rape notwithstanding the child’s consent.
The interpretation of these enactments must, of course, be guided by the bill of 
rights,50 and, in this case, the following provisions will no doubt be decisive. Sec-
tion 12(2) provides: “[e]veryone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, 
which includes the right – (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to 
security in and control over their body …” Even more important is section 28(2). 
This provides: “[a] child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every mat-
ter concerning the child”.51
45 Note, however, that the cautionary rule requiring corroboration of a woman’s evidence is no longer 
required (S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (SCA)).
46 See par 5 below.
47 See Sigsworth “Gender-based violence in transition” in Concept Paper for the Centre for the Study 
of Violence and Reconciliation (2008) 11; Van der Hoven “Domestic violence in South Africa” 2001 
Acta Criminologica 14 and Curran and Bonthuys “Customary law and domestic violence in rural 
South African communities” 2005 SAJHR 607 ff.
48 In this regard, see the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, particularly the preamble.
49 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) par 25.
50 s 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996.
51 Note that, for purposes of s 28, s (3) provides that “child” means a person under the age of 18 years.
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3 Suit in delict: more about consent
Apart from prosecution under the criminal law, virginity testing might also occasion 
a suit in delict.52 The most obvious form of injury would be a sexually transmitted 
disease: inspections are often performed bare-handed, and, even when gloves are 
worn, the same pair may be used to examine up to 600 girls at a time.53 Otherwise, 
the plaintiff could claim damages for an iniuria, on the ground that the defendant 
had wrongfully and intentionally injured her dignity and reputation.
Whether or not the action lies for patrimonial loss or for iniuria, the woman would 
be required to bring the suit when she became aware of the harm she had suffered. If 
she were still underage, an appropriate guardian would have to act on her behalf.54
In the event of a delictual action, the two critical issues are wrongfulness and 
the defence of volenti non fit iniuria. Wrongfulness is fully dealt with in the section 
below, which considers the constitutional implications of virginity testing, and pos-
sible objections to the legislation regulating it.55 Here, it need only be noted:
“Any intentional act which involves the likelihood of bodily harm to another and which is not rec-
ognised by modern usage as a normal and acceptable practice of society is forbidden by law and is 
in no way dependent upon the absence of consent on the part of the victim.”56
Consent poses a separate problem. A successful plea of volenti non fit iniuria has 
six requirements. First, the consent must not be contra bonos mores.57 In so far as 
virginity testing contravenes the Children’s Act and the Sexual Offences Act, any 
possible consent could be deemed contra bonos mores. Secondly, whatever injury 
is suffered must fall within the limits of the consent given. Thirdly, the person con-
cerned must subjectively consent to the act, and, fourthly, she must be capable of 
doing so, ie, must be intellectually mature enough to appreciate the implications of 
the act in question. Given the age of some of the girls undergoing virginity testing, 
this requirement will probably not be met.
Fifthly, the consent must be given freely or voluntarily. Whenever girls are co-
erced into doing something to their prejudice, their consent is invalid. The coercion 
need not be physical: moral, social and economic factors may also amount to the 
compulsion that negates volition.58 In the case of virginity inspections, social pres-
52 under the common law. It is most unlikely that a suit would lie under customary law, although 
determining whether the common or customary law applied (or indeed the common-law of crime) 
would be far from easy – Bennett Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa  The Conflict of 
Personal Laws (1985) 75 and 107.
53 Le Roux (n 6) 14-15. Also see Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 538. Furthermore, “[s]ince it was well known 
that virginity testers looked for something resembling a white veil (an indication of an intact hymen) 
in the vaginal canal, some girls in KwaZulu-Natal resorted to inserting toothpaste or freshly cut 
meat into their vaginas to make the vagina appear ‘tight’ and so mimic the white veil effect” – Le 
Roux (n 6) 15.
54 Presumably, to be determined by customary law – Bennett (n 52) 115.
55 An interesting comparison, in this respect, would be the ruling of a Canadian court in Thomas v 
Norris 1992 2 CNLR 139 (BCSC).
56 S v Sikunyana 1961 3 SA 549 (E) 551H-552A. As far as criminal liability is concerned, “acceptable 
practice of South African society” has never been determined by African norms. R v Matomana 
1938 EDL 128 131, eg, held that it would be contrary to public interests to excuse a death resulting 
from stick fighting on the ground of consent.
57 See, eg, Matomana’s case and Phiri v R 1963 R&N 395 (SR).
58 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser The Law of Delict (2006) 92 and Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
(1997) 115 par 89. See, eg, R v McCoy 1953 2 SA 4 (SR) 11.
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sure could well constitute coercion in the sense that girls might be intimidated by 
both their peers and authority figures.59
“It is, for example, difficult (and unacceptable in terms of cultural values) to envisage the daughter 
of a staunch traditionalist challenging her father by refusing to be subjected to have her virginity 
tested. Moreover, a girl who refuses to submit to the practice risks being ostracized and stigmatized 
by the community she lives in as a non-virgin, and social pressure often results in the girls ‘volun-
teering’ to undergo the process.”60
Finally, the person consenting must realise and have full knowledge of the extent 
of any (possible) prejudice. Even if a virginity test does not result in physical harm, 
the violation of the individual’s rights to dignity, equality, security of the person and 
privacy61 may cause harm of an emotional or psychological nature.62 Public expo-
sure, for instance, could be experienced as degrading or humiliating, and failure of 
the test might well result in the girl suffering substantial social prejudice. If she is 
given a “C” grade, she could be deemed to have brought shame to her family, and 
her parents may be required to pay a fine for tainting the community.63
The girls are highly unlikely to be aware of all the possible consequences. While 
the Children’s Act requires pre-examination counselling, it gives no indication what 
this counselling entails. In any event, we have no evidence of the regular provision 
of such facilities, although they are apparently available in some instances for those 
who fail the test.64
4  Culture and the constitution
Proponents of virginity testing defend it on the ground that it is a cultural tradi-
tion, which is a common justification for practices that deviate from general social 
norms.65 Until the new constitutional dispensation, such an argument would have 
lacked a solid normative basis in South African law,66 but now defendants in delict-
ual actions or accused persons charged with offences under the Children’s Act and 
59 Le Roux (n 6) 66, May (n 1) 41 and Mahery (n 3) 9-10.
60 May (n 1) 41.
61 The constitution protects dignity under s 10, equality under s 9, security of the person under s 12(2) 
and privacy under s 14.
62 Le Roux (n 6) 15 and Mahery (n 3) 10-11. As George (n 6) 1475 says: “Most relevant to the testing 
debate is the protection of informational privacy regarding chastity status. As presently practiced, 
virginity testing makes a public spectacle of private, personal, and intimate matters.”
63 May (n 1) 7 and Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 539.
64 Le Roux (n 6) 15, Mahery (n 3) 6 and Leclerc-Madlala (n 5) 538.
65 Hence, it was held in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) 
that, although the customs and habits of a certain group may seem unusual and threatening to the wider 
society, the state is obliged to tolerate divergence from the norm. In democratic states, the majority can 
always enforce its interests through the legislative process, but minorities need special protection. See, 
too, Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) par 22.
66 Indeed, African cultural traditions have featured only occasionally in delictual or criminal cases. 
See, eg, the Matomana case (n 56) 131, which concerned stick fighting, and the following cases 
which concerned ukutwala (a mock abduction as a preliminary to marriage) and rape: R v Swartbooi 
1916 EDL 170; R v Mane 1948 1 SA 196 (E) and R v Sita 1954 4 SA 20 (E) 22. In the latter case, the 
court held that custom cannot override the common law of crime, no matter whether the custom is 
legal or illegal.
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Sexual Offences Act may claim the special protection offered by section 30 and 31 
of the bill of rights,67 otherwise known as the “cultural defence”.68
Indeed, virginity inspections enjoy substantial support in communities where 
the procedures are regularly undertaken. Traditional rulers have objected to the in-
terference by government and other outsiders with their subjects’ right to pursue 
cultural traditions.69 For such advocates of the testing procedures, the legislation 
protecting women’s and children’s rights is a violation of their right to freedom of 
cultural expression.70
Section 30 of the constitution provides: “Everyone has the right to use the lan-
guage and to participate in the cultural life of their choice …”, and section 31(1) 
provides: “Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community – (a) to enjoy their 
culture …”. The second clause of section 30 and section 31(2), however, carry on to 
stipulate that the rights in question may not be exercised “in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights”. This so-called internal limitation clause 
means that the freedom to enjoy a culture of choice may not be exercised at the ex-
pense of any other provision in the bill of rights.71
Hence, before challenging the legality of the children’s and sexual offences acts 
for violating sections 30 and 31, parties arguing for the freedom of culture must, in 
principle, establish whether the practice in question passes the internal limitation 
clauses. Here, they would immediately be met with the charge that virginity inspec-
tions infringe the rights to dignity,72 security of the person73 and equality,74 and, 
further, that “[a] child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every mat-
ter concerning the child”.75 The most obvious violation is of the right to equality:76 
67 Note that South Africa is party to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005), which it ratified on 21 Dec 2006.
68 This defence has a bearing on the lawfulness of the crime, the accused’s capacity, mens rea and 
sentencing. See Carstens “The cultural defence in criminal law: South African perspectives” 2004 
De Jure 312.
69 See George (n 6) 1483 and Moya “The virginity tester” Mail & Guardian Online (23-09-2005) http://
www.mg.co.za/article/2005-09-23-the-virginity-tester (1-06-2009).
70 See, for instance, Vincent “Virginity testing in South Africa: Re-traditioning the postcolony” 2006 
Culture, Health & Sexuality 17 18.
71 This clause was designed to prevent particular communities from “privatising” offensive practic-
es and to exclude the oppressive features of domestic relationships within cultural communities: 
Christian Education case (n 65) par 26. The view of the constitutional court is consistent with that 
taken by the International Committee on Human Rights (General Comment No 23 on art 27 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and Principle 1 (Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms) of art 2 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions.
72 s 10: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”
73 s 12(2): “Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right – (a) 
to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security in and control over their body; and (c) not 
to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.”
74 s 9(1): “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.” 
s 9(2): “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.”
75 s 28(2): “A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” 
For purposes of this section, s 28(3) provides that “child” means a person under the age of 18 years.
76 See George (n 6) 1470 ff.
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by insisting that women, not men, remain chaste before marriage, virginity testing 
clearly discriminates against women.77
In addition to the internal limitation inquiry under sections 30 and 31, however, 
if laws or practices infringing the bill of rights are to be considered constitutionally 
acceptable, they must meet the detailed criteria laid down in section 36(1) of the 
constitution, the limitations clause.78 These criteria may be summarised as follows. 
In the first place, the law or practice in question must be of general application (ie, 
sufficiently clear and accessible),79 and it must apply equally to all, and must not be 
arbitrary in its application.80 The children’s and sexual offences acts obviously meet 
these requirements.
In the second place, the law or practice must be reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. This 
means that the rule or practice must serve a constitutionally acceptable purpose,81 
and that a balance must be struck between the extent to which it infringes the con-
stitutional rights and the benefits it is designed to achieve.82 Although section 36(1) 
lists the factors to be taken into account when considering reasonableness and jus-
tifiability, there is no standard test.83 The inquiry depends on the circumstances of 
each case.
If we consider, for the moment, an argument defending virginity testing on the 
ground that it is an established cultural practice, we would need to ask whether it is 
worthwhile and important in a constitutional democracy.84 This question demands 
proof of an underlying connection between the practice and its purpose,85 such that 
the practice aptly serves that purpose.86 The purpose must then be weighed against 
the infringement of other rights.87 In other words, the benefits must outweigh the 
costs.88
77 Apparently, boys can also be subjected to virginity testing (presumably on the basis of ethno-
medical beliefs). If this is done, the select committee on social services (n 24) said that “virgin-
ity tests done on males must be done by males”. See Bridgraj “Much ado about virginity” Mail & 
Guardian (22-09-1998).
78 “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – (a) the 
nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of 
the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose.”
79 Such that those who are affected by its application know what is relevant to the exercise of their 
powers or in what circumstances they are entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision. Dawood 
v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 
2000 3 SA 936 (CC).
80 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 169.
81 Currie and De Waal (n 80) 177.
82 See S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388 (CC): “In sum, therefore, the Court places the 
purpose, effects and importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature 
and effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The more substantial the inroad 
into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must be” (par 18).
83 Thus, as Currie and De Waal (n 80) 178 note, the five “relevant factors” are not a checklist or an 
exhaustive catalogue of what must be considered in the limitation inquiry.
84 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 185.
85 Currie and De Waal (n 80) 182.
86 According to Currie and De Waal (n 80) 183, if the law or practice only marginally contributes 
to achieving its purpose, it cannot be adequate justification for an infringement of fundamental 
rights.
87 S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) par 34. See Le Roux (n 6) 44-58.
88 Currie and De Waal (n 80) 183-184. This issue is further discussed in the conclusion to this article.
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A limitation inquiry, similar to one that would be required for virginity testing, 
arose in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education.89 Here, the ap-
plicant argued that a statutory provision prohibiting corporal punishment violated 
the religious and cultural freedoms of certain Christian communities, because chas-
tisement whether by cane, ruler, strap or paddle was a vital element of Christian life. 
The court a quo dismissed the argument on the ground that corporal punishment, 
even if exercised as a result of religious belief, was inconsistent with the bill of rights, 
in particular the right to dignity and the freedom from degrading punishment.
While the high court disposed of the applicants’ claim on the basis of the internal 
limitation clause in section 31(2) alone, the constitutional court proceeded directly 
to a section 36 limitations inquiry.90 It found that, whilst the right to culture had 
been limited by legislation banning corporal punishment, this limitation was rea-
sonable and justifiable,91 largely because of the need to protect children’s rights to 
dignity, freedom and security of the person.92 On balance, these rights outweighed 
those of the parents (especially in light of the fact that parents would still be able to 
discipline their children by using physical means of chastisement in the home).93
A comparable situation is posed by virginity testing, except that the proponents 
argue, in addition to culture, a variety of social benefits: that virginity testing helps 
to teach young girls the value of chastity before marriage;94 that it contributes to 
the prevention of teenage pregnancy; and that it can be used to detect children who 
have been sexually abused by adults. Most important, however, is the claim that, by 
promoting chastity, virginity testing inhibits the spread of HIV/AIDS.95
A contrary argument would be that the groups concerned also have access to 
equivalent, medically supervised tests that operate within the terms of the constitu-
tion. After all, both the state and private organisations have made these forms of 
testing for HIV/AIDS freely available, usually accompanied by counselling serv-
ices.96 Given this answer to the claim of social benefits, together with the range of 
rights infringed, any challenge to the validity of the children’s and sexual offences 
acts would be most unlikely to succeed.
In any event, a more probable suit would be a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the practice of virginity testing on the ground that it violates a number of sections in 
the constitution, not to mention at least three international conventions aimed at pro-
tecting women and children against harmful cultural practices: the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),97 the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)98 and the African Char-
89 1999 4 SA 1092 (SEC).
90 Christian Education case (n 65).
91 Christian Education case (n 65) par 52.
92 Christian Education case (n 65) par 41, 43 and 47.
93 Christian Education case (n 65) par 38 and 51.
94 Thereby maintaining their lobolo value: Mahery (n 3) 6 and May (n 1) 2.
95 Le Roux (n 6) 13 and May (n 1) 2. 
96 For example, the HIV Testing Week (held between 3 and 8 Nov 2008) provided free testing and 
counselling services at government and non-governmental organization sites in various parts of 
the country. See http://www.sagoodnews.co.za/health and_hiv_aids/get_tested_during_hivtestin-
gweek.html (9-02-2009).
97 Ratified by South Africa on 16 June 1995. Under art 24(2)(e), “States Parties shall take effective 
and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of 
children”.
98 Ratified by South Africa on 15 Dec 1995.
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ter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.99 Article 21(1) of the latter, for instance, 
provides:
“States parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social 
and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child 
in particular:
(a) those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child; and
(b) those customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the grounds of sex or other sta-
tus.”
While the international instruments are binding on the South African state only in 
its relations with other states, they do indicate a general trend in thinking: that the 
individual is not to be sacrificed to the group’s right to pursue a cultural practice.100 
South African constitutional jurisprudence supports this argument: although every-
one is free to practise a culture of choice, this freedom does not imply that individu-
als are obliged to follow suit. In other words, the individual is free to choose.101
O’Regan J’s minority judgment in MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay102 
gave an even keener edge to this line of thinking. The learned Judge said that sec-
tions 30 and 31 of the bill of rights protect not so much the right of groups to prac-
tise their cultures, but rather the rights of individuals within communities. In other 
words, cultural rights are “associative rights exercised by individual human beings 
and are not rights that attach to groups”.103
In disputes about individual and group rights, children are a special case. While 
they, too, are entitled to enjoy a cultural tradition,104 they are in no position to parti-
cipate in discussions about their options. They must simply accept whatever society 
and their families present to them. However, in this, as in all other situations where 
they are unable to exercise freedom of choice, the courts must ensure protection of 
their best interests, a principle that is enshrined in section 28(2) of the bill of rights. 
It follows that no child may be compelled to undergo vaginal inspections against 
her will, and that the various age restrictions provided in the Children’s and Sexual 
Offences Acts must be strictly applied as presumptive devices to indicate when 
children are capable of expressing an informed consent.
5  Conclusion: reconceiving arguments of rights and culture
From the existing constitutional jurisprudence in South Africa, it is clear that any-
one wanting to contest the validity of provisions in the Sexual Offences Act or the 
99 Ratified by South African on 7 Jan 2000. It is noteworthy that the preamble of the charter provides 
that: “Any custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, 
duties and obligations contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such inconsistency be 
discouraged.”
100 Such was the ruling in the Thomas case (n 55) 160. See the discussion by Isaac “Individual versus collec-
tive rights: Aboriginal people and the significance of Thomas v Norris” 1992 Manitoba LJ 618 ff.
101 MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) par 66.
102 (n 101).
103 Pillay case (n 101) par 150. O’Regan J went on (par 157) to explain that culture gives meaning to the 
lives of individuals, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall goals of human dignity and 
the “unity and solidarity amongst all who live in our diverse society”.
104 a 30 of the Children’s Rights Convention provides: “In those states in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority 
or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her 
group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or 
her own language.”
TSAR 2010 . 2 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
266 BENNETT, MILLS AND MUNNICK
Children’s Act dealing with virginity testing would have a well-nigh impossible 
case to argue. Traditionalist advocates of testing, however, have declared that they 
have no intention of abandoning the practice.105 Hence, the dispute has settled into a 
familiar trench warfare of cultural relativism versus human rights universalism.
George contends that, if it were conceded that neither culture nor rights are as 
rigid as their protagonists would have us believe, a more productive dialogue might 
ensue. As she says, the parties have drawn the wrong battle lines.106 By adopting 
such intransigent views, they present the problem as virginity testing itself, thereby 
determining the form of the debate and the possible solutions. Either abolish the 
practice or capitulate to culture.107
The greater problem, however, is an urgent need to devise a new, more adaptive 
approach to public health, especially, of course HIV/AIDS. George argues that the 
human rights campaigners fail to appreciate the fact that cultural practices may af-
ford valuable opportunities for positive change, while traditionalists fail to see that 
maintaining a tradition is less important than preventing the spread of disease.108 
If the parties were willing to strip away the cultural rhetoric surrounding virginity 
testing, and treat it as a simple public health measure, a useful “self-help solution 
[might appear] where there are limited options for South African women and girls 
to successfully avoid infection and obtain treatment for infection”.109
If the issue were reconceived in this way, rights activists would have to interpret 
rights more broadly and shift their attention to the state’s duty to combat a serious 
epidemic. This change of perspective would entail paying more attention to the right 
to health.110 Until now, the rights lobby has focused on first-generation civil and po-
litical rights, without sufficient regard to the, as yet, undeveloped second-generation 
rights (which include health).111
If a reasonable compromise is to be reached with the proponents of cultural tra-
dition, however, then the latter will, in their turn, have to reconsider the idea of 
culture. This is a much more complex problem. In their arguments in favour of vir-
ginity testing, traditionalists mobilise two persistent, but misleading, conceptions 
of culture.
The first is to treat culture as a discrete system of practices, beliefs and norms that 
sprang from some type of primordial Volksgeist, with the implication that culture 
105 In the face of concerted opposition of this nature, legal anthropology has shown repeatedly that 
such legislative bans are seldom effective. George (n 6) 1484 and 1486 (n 228) citing Merry “Global 
human rights and local social movements in a legally plural world” 1997 Can J L & Soc 247 249-250 
and 268-269 discussing the problems of enforcing laws prohibiting spousal abuse in traditional 
culture.
106 George (n 6) 1482.
107 George (n 6) 1450.
108 George (n 6) 1487 ff bases her argument on the philosophies of pragmatism and capabilities theory. 
The latter concentrates on the individual freedoms needed to achieve fulfilment in general, and 
the capabilities to function in particular. Because the theory accepts the importance of context, it 
accommodates arguments of culture. Pragmatism, of course, rejects principles for their own sake, 
directing attention instead to the actual consequences of given courses of action.
109 George (n 6) 1483-1484.
110 Contained in s 27 of the constitution. Subsection 1 guarantees the right “to have access to … health 
care services, including reproductive health care”. Subsection 2 obliges the government to “take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realization of … these rights”.
111 See George (n 6) 1451.
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somehow preceded and determined the physical world.112 The second is to explain or 
justify cultural practices in terms of functionalism, a theory about human behaviour 
which assumes that each item of culture contributes to the well-being of the overall 
society.113 According to this line of thinking, those conducting the virginity tests 
advance various utilitarian justifications, primarily the argument that the tests help 
to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.
The essentialist idea of culture, however, was long ago refuted in scholarly circles. 
Far from being an integrated system determining current attitudes and behaviours, 
culture is now accepted as being a social construct, whose main purpose is rhetori-
cal: a means whereby a group can establish its identity and thus distinguish itself 
from other groups.114 Hence, in the academic literature, culture is now regarded as 
a repertoire of assorted practices and discourses that people generate through dis-
putes over signs and meanings.115
This view has been accepted by the constitutional court in its judgments on cus-
tomary law, which is a typical product of culture. The court has indicated that it will 
give effect to only the “living” version of customary law, one that “has evolved and 
developed to meet the changing needs of the community”.116 Accordingly, in Shilu-
bana v Nwamitwa,117 Van der Westhuizen J stressed the idea that communities are 
free to change their customary laws in response to new social problems. Cultural 
traditions should not be regarded as static and systematically integrated, but, rather, 
as contradictory, contested and dynamic.118 It follows that the “courts, as outsiders, 
must seek to avoid imposing a false internal coherence and unity on a particular 
cultural community”.119
The functionalist/utilitarian argument in support of culture, however, has even 
more obvious attractions than the essentialist. Any practice which can combat HIV/
AIDS – at no cost to the state – has clear appeal in a country which is struggling 
with a rampant epidemic (bearing in mind that most of those infected are female).120 
112 See the discussion by Fishbayn “Litigating the right to culture: Family law in the new South Africa” 
1999 International Journal of Law, Policy & The Family 147 159. See, too, Chanock “‘Culture’ and 
human rights: Orientalising, occidentalising and authenticity” in Mamdani (ed) Beyond Rights Talk 
and Culture Talk (2000) 21 ff.
113 Kaplan and Manners Culture Theory (1972) 60-63.
114 All cultures are inherently oppositional, and consciousness of difference arises whenever two or 
more social groups are driven into close interaction. See Roosens Creating Ethnicity  The Process 
of Ethnogenesis (1989) 12.
115 Merry “Law, culture and cultural appropriation” 1998 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 575 577.
116 Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) par 53. See, too, Ex Parte Chairperson 
of the Constitutional Assembly  In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 4 SA 
744 (CC) 197 and Langa DCJ, in Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) par 81 and 153.
117 2007 5 SA 620 (CC) par 54.
118 Shilubana case (n 117) 154. See, too, Merry (n 115) 580, who notes that a cultural tradition is dynam-
ic (not static), indeterminate (not bounded), contested (not consensual), an instrument of power (not 
democratic), and, above all, negotiated and constructed through human action. Following this line 
of thinking, O’Regan J in the Pillay case (n 101) par 152 said: “It is also important to remember that 
cultural, religious and linguistic communities are not static communities that can be captured in 
constitutional amber and preserved from change. Our constitutional understanding of culture needs 
to recognise that these communities, like all human communities, are dynamic. It is tempting as an 
observer to seek to impose coherence and unity on communities that are not, in the lived experience 
of those who are members of those communities, entirely unified.”
119 Pillay case (n 101) par 153.
120 George (n 6) 1447 1448-9 citing a Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update  
December 2006, 11, UNAIDS/06.29E (Dec 2006) http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ 
HIVData/EpiUpdate/EpiUpdArchive/2006 (19-10-2009) which noted that 56% of those suffering 
from HIV in South Africa are female.
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Such justifications, however, are inherently problematic. How are we to determine 
the “success” of virginity testing? On the one hand, we have no reliable evidence 
substantiating the traditionalists’ claim, and, on the other, the virginity inspections 
have certain harmful results, such as the provision of targets for men because it is 
widely believed that intercourse with a virgin cures the HIV virus.121 Thus, when 
measured against factual outcomes, the functionalist line of reasoning is seldom 
likely to be conclusive.
Nevertheless, arguments of cultural tradition have an obvious emotive appeal. 
Indeed, they generally serve a more abstract purpose than the production of meas-
urable social benefits.122 As with essentialism, the constitutional court is moving 
towards a more sceptical view of the functionalist approach. In the Pillay case,123 a 
case concerning the wearing of a nose stud – and thus difficult to justify as some-
thing contributing to the welfare of the social group – O’Regan J said that culture 
serves to give meaning to the lives of individuals, thereby helping to fulfil the over-
all goals of human dignity and the “unity and solidarity amongst all who live in our 
diverse society”.
Implicit in the current understanding of culture, and distinguishing it from the 
past conception, are two key elements: human action and choice.124 A focus on these 
elements, as opposed to the old impasse between rights and culture, may open new 
and more productive avenues of inquiry.
The first such inquiry would be into the perpetrator(s) of a cultural practice and 
the group that benefits most. In the Pillay case,125 O’Regan J suggested this type of 
approach, when she said that sections 30 and 31 of the constitution contemplate only 
associative practices, not those designed to suit the interests of certain persons or 
groups at particular times. Thus, we must ask “whether a particular asserted prac-
tice is shared within the broader community, or portion of it, and therefore properly 
understood as a cultural practice rather than a personal habit or preference …”126 
The second inquiry, which is linked to the first, is choice. If culture is to retain its 
legitimacy, it must rest on a history of democratic participation.
When we pursue these inquiries in the context of virginity testing, it appears that 
the tradition was revived largely due to the efforts of two women: Andile Gumede 
and Nomagugu Ngobese. Evidently, they began by organising small gatherings of 
teenage girls for public testing, with a view to persuading like-minded people to 
participate in a movement that would re-instate the symbolic importance of vir-
121 Le Roux (n 6) 15 and Meel “The myth of child rape as a cure for HIV/AIDS in Transkei: A case 
report” 2003 Medical Science Law 85. In addition, the inspections have led to commercialisa-
tion and corruption. Parashar “Where angels fear to tread” Mail & Guardian Online (6-08-2004) 
and Leclerc-Madlala (n 5). On the negative consequences of virginity testing, see George (n 6) 
1460-64.
122 As far as the constitution is concerned, support for culture is designed to maintain social diversity. 
This principle was enshrined in the interim constitution of 1993, which obliged those responsible for 
drafting the final act to protect South Africa’s diverse cultures: constitutional principle XI, contained 
in sch 4, as read with s 71(1)(a) of the interim constitution. Moreover, as the Christian Education 
case (n 65) par 25 held, because the majority in democratic states can always enforce its interests 
through the legislative process, minority cultural and religious groups need special protection.
123 Pillay case (n 101) par 157.
124 Although the fact of human selection and creation often leads to an accusation that a culture is not 
genuine, culture cannot be dismissed as false or inauthentic merely because its incidents are delib-
erately made or chosen: Roosens (n 114) 155. Even so, as Roosens (156) says, culture is never a 
completely arbitrary construct. It is always scripted from a minimum of incontestable facts.
125 Pillay case (n 101) par 144.
126 Pillay case (n 101) par 154.
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ginity.127 Given the fact that many families in South Africa now lack responsible 
parents to head households – a situation that is being constantly exacerbated by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic – grandmothers and elderly women have had to bear the brunt 
of child-rearing.128 Hence, it is hardly surprising that these matriarchs are most in 
favour of the tradition.129
Does it follow, however, that the courts must accept whatever a litigant (or group 
of litigants) proposes as a constitutionally protected activity? In other words, how 
are we to determine whether a culture deserves constitutional protection? If the 
argument of freedom of culture is reduced to no more than a rhetorical justification 
for whatever activity suits the interests of a particular group at a particular time – 
which is the direction in which the academic literature might lead – we will have no 
means of deciding whether sections 30 and 31 of the constitution can legitimately 
be invoked.
One of the most obvious guarantees of legitimacy is compliance with South Af-
rica’s new constitutional order, notably, in the case of culture, democratic partici-
pation.130 In this respect, tradition is an important ally, since the legitimacy of any 
system of custom rests on community involvement.131 Tradition is a social phenom-
enon, requiring the participation of a given community. Unlike a habit, or even a 
custom, it cannot be tied to the behaviour of a particular group or individual. Hence, 
although an individual may begin a practice, the question whether it takes root can 
be decided only after a period of time, and only if it passes the test of community 
acceptance.132 It follows that tradition is a powerful force for determining not only 
the social fact of a rule but also its legitimacy.133
Traditionalists therefore have difficult questions to answer. Bearing in mind that 
most of the girls being tested are under-age, so their consent is of doubtful validity, 
would it not be true to say that the practice serves the interests of only a limited 
group of traditionalists? Should virginity testing be protected under the constitu-
tional guarantee of cultural traditions, given its demise in the last century, and the 
claim that it now serves as a prophylaxis against an entirely modern phenomenon, 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic? Would it not be closer to the truth to say that it simply pro-
claims a cultural identity and the reassuring security of returning to the past?
127 Scorgie (n 4) 57.
128 See, for instance, Izzard “Migrants and mothers: Case studies from Botswana” 1985 JSAS 258; 
Burman “Intergenerational family care: Legacy of the past, implications for the future” 1996 JSAS 
585 and Murray Families Divided; The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho (1981) 110-112.
129 George (n 6) 1458.
130 Which is already a requirement of s 36(1), the limitation section. Moreover, although a right of 
democratic participation is not specified in those terms, s 9 and 19 of the bill of rights provide a basis 
from which it may be developed.
131 See further Krygier “Tradition as law” 1986 Law & Philosophy 237 240-241.
132 In this respect, the recent decision in the Shilubana case (n 117) par 54 apparently minimised the 
importance of community practice, whether past or present. For general purposes, the court held that 
past practice constitutes only one of several factors that must be considered. See Van der Westhuizen 
J’s three factor test (par 44-47 and 76). On the question of tradition, see Himonga “Taking stock of 
changes to customary law in a new South Africa” in Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of A J Kerr (2006) 
215 226.
133 Krygier (n 131) 240-241.
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SAMEVATTING
MAAGDELIKHEIDSTOETSING: MISDAAD, ONREGMATIGE DAAD OF WARE KUL­
TUURTRADISIE?
Tradisioneel het al die inheemse kulture van Suidelike Afrika die beskerming van vroulike maagdelik-
heid hoog geskat. Dit was belangrik om maagdelikheid as bedingingsvoordeel in huweliksonderhan-
delinge te gebruik. Daarom was jong meisies verplig om gereelde inspeksies te ondergaan. Alhoewel 
hierdie praktyk stelselmatig in onbruik verval het, het dit in die laaste twee dekades opnuut byval 
gevind. Dit is nou ’n instelling by die belangrikste tradisionele feeste, merkbaar veral in Zoeloeland. 
As die jeugdigheid van die meisies, sowel as die sosiale druk om deel te neem aan die proses egter in 
ag geneem word, blyk dit dat diegene wat verantwoordelik is vir die oplewing van die praktyk hulself 
geregtelik kan blootstel. In die verband kom veral deliktuele eise ter sprake maar ook strafregtelike 
vervolging ingevolge die Wet op Kindersorg 38 van 2005 en die Wysigingswet op die Strafreg (Seksuele 
Misdrywe en Verwante Aangeleenthede) 32 van 2007 is gepas.
Ten spyte van die grondwetlike waarborg van kulturele vryheid ingevolge artikels 30 en 31 van die 
grondwet, blyk dit bykans onmoontlik te wees om maagdelikheidstoetse te regverdig in die lig van an-
der grondwetlike beginsels soos gelykheid, menswaardigheid en die reg op fisiese integriteit.
In die lig van onlangse argumente deur Erika George het die heersende debat oor inheemse kulture 
en menseregte ’n dooiepunt bereik. Daarom moet ons eerder konsentreer op die brandende kwessie van 
openbare gesondheid, wat beter kan bydra tot die behoorlike regulering van maagdelikheidstoetse. Die 
doelwit kan slegs bereik word as voorstanders van beide kante hul standpunte oor kultuur en mense-
regte aanpas en ’n meer inskiklike benadering tot hierdie begrippe as vertrekpunt benut.
“That today’s professional judge owes a general duty to give reasons is clear ... The duty is a function 
of due process, and therefore of justice. Its rationale has two principal aspects. The first is that fairness 
surely requires that the parties – especially the losing party – should be left in no doubt why they have 
won or lost. ... The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind; if it is fulfilled, 
the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the evidence than if it is not. ... [W]
here the dispute involves something in the nature of an intellectual exchange, with reasons and analysis 
advanced on either side, the judge must enter into the issues canvassed before him and explain why he 
prefers one case over the other. ... The rule is the same: the judge must explain why he has reached his 
decision. ... Transparency should be the watchword” – Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd 2000 1 
All ER 373 377-378 (CA).
